Chinese Government Spent $685 million in Subsidies for New Energy Vehicles 2013-15

Chinese subsidies are an ongoing source of trade friction. How Chinese subsidies contribute to overcapacity in the new energy vehicle (NEV) is therefore a topic of interest. One difficulty in studying this topic lies in the frequent unavailability of official statistics on subsidies. However, relevant information is occasionally released, such as during the investigation of subsidy fraud.

An official investigation of subsidy fraud in the NEV sector in 2016 provides some hard numbers. Chinese press reports indicate that more than half of the Chinese companies producing NEVs were implicated in a range of fraudulent practices to obtain subsidies. In its fraud report, Ministry of Finance (MOF) mentioned that the central government spent 33.4 billion yuan on subsidizing from 2009 to 2015. A private-sector analyst reported that on July 9 2016, State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) statistics showed that from 2013 to 2015, central government paid out 28.44 billion yuan in NEV subsidies, while local governments paid out more than 20 billion. (It is unclear whether the SASAC number and MOF number are calculated using the same methodology.) A comprehensive list of suspected manufacturers and the subsidies they collected through illicit means was leaked.¹

Distortions created by subsidies may contribute to overcapacity. According to an April 2018 article, by June 2017, NEV capacity Chinese producers are building has surpassed 20 million vehicles, or 10 times the capacity of what the government guidelines planned for up to the year 2020. According to a researcher with Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) affiliation, the overcapacity may be much larger than the Chinese market can absorb for the next several years.²

The inefficiencies due to the poorly designed subsidies are, according to some analysts, harmful to Chinese domestic industry. To begin with, subsidies hurt competitiveness. The market price of NEVs from Chinese producers are twice as high as those from joint venture producers. In addition, through flawed design and implementation, the subsidy regime lead to fraudulent behavior that disrupt industry norms and encourage rent-seeking. Such problems can undermine the health of an entire sector if extensive enough. According to 21^st Century Economic Herald, virtually all automobile conglomerates in China were implicated in the MOF investigation.

The Chinese government has undertaken several rounds of reform of direct subsidies for NEVs. They are now smaller and better targeted. However, there has been less scrutiny of other subsidies the government provides to NEVs, such as that for infrastructure, mandated by a 2015 circular from the National Reform and Development Commission. There is some evidence that inefficiencies and fraud may also plague charging stations for NEVs. It is worthwhile to continue to track the development of these policies.

1 China’s 21^st Century Economic Herald reported that it was able to confirm through a number of off-the-record sources that the leaked data was accurate. See “72 Auto Companies Suspected of Subsidy Fraud: Time to Rethink The 3 Top Issues and Policy Design from Above,” September, 13, 2018 (accessed may 18, 2018.) http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2016-09/13/content_46679.htm

2 Other analysts maintain that a lot of the planned capacity may never materialize, depending on external factors.

Caution against Hasty Decisions in China: the Case of HNA

Alert: This was written in late January 2018 and the picture has shifted again. Still, it may be useful to keep the larger lesson in mind.

 

In the opaque policy environment in China, it may behoove those of us on the outside to take a closer look at what Chinese investors are thinking and doing. What lies behind the woes of China’s juggernaut, HNA? Many in Chinese bond market see the saga as part of a power play at the top that is far from over. A mid-December 2017 WeChat commentary retweeted by “The Finance Gossip Girl” (金融八卦女)  pointed out that the bond market had not been overly hasty to dismiss HNA and Wanda as dead and gone. Some investors had been, until as late as December 2017, content to “sit back and watch the big show unfold,” having learned their lesson when “blind short-selling” over the embattled Wanda and Hongqiao did not pay off earlier in the summer. The writer delicately alludes to the “labyrinthine shareholder arrangements, opaque subsidiary deals, the two mysterious charities and the stake giveaway that defies common sense,” echoing suspicions that HNA is organized deliberately to hide owners with high-level political connections. This is consistent with Western press reporting.

While this is only a theory, we do have some evidence that some powerful players went to bat for HNA late in the day against central government stance.  Eight policy and commercial banks and the provincial government in Hainan were still vocally supportive of HNA by year-end in a public Dec. 13 announcement (CDB, BOC, CCB，EIBC, ABC, SDPB, ICBC, BOCOM all spoke up here.) The Hainan-based executives said they wanted to get behind the Hainan Deputy Party Secretary Shen Xiaoming’s directive that the well-being of the province is tied to HNA’s fortunes. Only after Guo Shuqing of CSRC said in the People’s Daily on Jan. 17, 2018 that there needs to be a cleanup of “a vast financial conglomerate” did the banks change direction.

The fight may still not be over. One of China’s widely read financial social media accounts confirms that Guo’s interview forms part of a larger and consistent policy trend that bodes ill for private sector conglomerates, including Ping An, HNA and, of course, Xiao Jianhua’s Tomorrow Holdings. We are to infer, from Guo’s reticence in not naming the firms directly, that the power play is still ongoing. A Hong-Kong based Chinese commentator thinks the December move by the banks and the Hainan official shows continuing local government disregard of central directives whenever possible, and may point to deeper political rifts. This makes sense since, in the Chinese system, provincial and banking officials rarely act on their own without some significant backing in the top leadership.

What does this mean for the rest of us? In short, in China, it’s not over until it’s over. Chinese bond buyers are not making snap decisions. There’s some food for thought in that.

(Note on the bond market reaction reporting: Granted, the writer may have toned down the bad news given the government’s frequent ban of financial information that is judged to trigger investor panic. Still, “The Finance Gossip Girl” has a proven track record of reporting on sensitive financial information. When “The Finance Gossip Girl” was shut down in June 2017 in the wave of crackdown on entertainment social media, a widely reposted article used the account as an example of successful social media 自媒体and the censorship risk they run, reporting that at its height the account had more than 3,000 sources in the industry and over time became widely respected for its integrity and accuracy.)

Beacon of Democracy: Taiwan as Hope for Chinese Civil Society

My research on the multifaceted impact of Taiwan’s Sunflower Movement on the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Whole article here.

Main Point: People in China are supporting democracy in Taiwan as part of their political liberalization. The demonstration effect of Taiwan’s democracy and its refutation of Beijing’s claims of Chinese exceptionalism both contribute to that liberalization, which the Chinese government considers a threat to its legitimacy. Over the long term, Chinese civil society’s support for Taiwan is likely to change the dynamics of cross-Strait relations. The world should take note of the significant benefits of Taiwan democracy for peace and stability in the region.

 

 

Save Matt Damon! or, Entertainment Content as Political Commentary in China

Telling political commentary is buried in unlikely places on the Chinese Internet.  Scandals about high-ranking officials and popular criticism of the government are disguised as entertainment gossip. The best proof of the potential for political change found in such gossip is in the goofy admissions from Chinese Internet companies that “aliens have abducted the webpage you’re trying to access”:

 

 

The fact that the companies are not content with just making the content disappear, but want to point fingers to the censors that make them do it, however subtly, speaks volumes. One of the most recent targets of this type of veiled political commentary is the movie “Great Wall” starring Matt Damon, due out February 2017.

Here is a quick sum-up of what the most upvoted Chinese users of Douban.com (Goodreads and Imdb rolled into one), have to say about the “Great Wall”:

“So spineless Hollywood was knocked to its knees with cold hard Chinese cash – I can accept that. But why should our very own Matt Damon get dragged into this muck? Save him!”

“Director Zhang Yimou has been dead a long time already.”

“Okay, fine, Jing Tian’s acting is world-class —— now will you please drop the gun?”

Waving the said gun, the Chinese Communist Party wants to keep its image as the sage leader of a powerful and prosperous country front and center. The Chinese equivalent of Rotten Tomatoes, IMDB and Amazon were chided by the censors recently.  Propaganda-approved movies pushing the Party’s message often received rock bottom scores from a jeering public. The authorities ordered the Internet firms hosting movie content to stop the nosebleed of its disgraced propaganda. How? By messing with user feedback on movies. The companies may delete unfavorable reviews, or even stop users from voting on a movie at all.

So let us  take a look to see how this has benefitted the Great Wall, a Chinese-Hollywood collaboration. It’s too bad that the steamy innuendos which sell movies so well are, in this case, about the movie but not in it. Jing Tian, the female lead of “Great Wall,” purportedly got the role through high-level connections within the Chinese system.  Ms. Tian is a great mystery. Of a belabored, heavy-duty beauty, with eyes likely surgically enlarged to achieve the terror-stricken stare of silent-film era stars, Jing has starred in a series of box office and critical low-ballers that hemorrhaged eye-popping sums of money. She acts about as well as a rock, hence the sarcasm of the last Chinese user review quoted above.

The man who foots Jing’s bill feeds the gossip mill that erodes the government’s legitimacy. There is a list of four names in circulation. A deputy Vice Minister of Propaganda? One of the direct descendants of the men who founded People’s Republic of China on a platform of banning official privilege? The contrast between the image of Xi’s Party as austere, all-correct and faithful, and such blatant patronage and corruption in China’s state-dominated movie industry, is not lost on the millions of gossip-news readers. This is the underside and bottom-up part of China’s anti-corruption campaign, and it’s likely to last long after Xi puts away the scalps of his arch-enemies.

Audience rejection of Party propaganda also comes out strong in their criticism of Director Zhang Yimou. Viewers feel a particular disappointment in Zhang, something akin to seeing Spike Lee morph into an unctuous Leni Riefenstahl chasing greenbacks. Zhang, a one-time Gold Lion winner, spent his more recent movies trumpeting that the people of China require benevolent despotism to save them from their own weakness and folly. Liberal Chinese mourn the one-time Gold Lion winner Zhang, whose courageous exploration of the Party’s misrule, including the Cultural Revolution, was banned (“To Live”).

Little surprise, then, that “Great Wall” is struggling with a 50% rating on the Chinese IMDB Douban (worse than 93% of all fantasy movies), despite a surge of paid boosters who attack the film’s detractors for “kissing the foreigners’ ass” and “sneering condescension at their own culture.” (Both the government and businesses in China are adroit manipulators of culture wars – sounds familiar?) Hollywood merely put the finishing touches on this disaster, spitting out a predictable script “with as many plot holes as monsters,” to quote another disdainful user review.

I would like to think there is a moral here. Keep that 50% rating in mind when debating whether to shell out another $39 bucks for your next movie outing. Follow the Chinese  people’s advice and skip the “Great Wall.” But by all means let us keep watching the political fireworks  that come out of China’s online gossip mill. It signals public dissatisfaction with Xi’s government that belies its 90% poll ratings. 

Post script: Xi’s government shut down a number of entertainment accounts on Chinese social media in June 2017. The official reasons given include “vulgarity” and the “hyping of the relationships and private lives of stars.”  A telling protest letter from a reader to a Hong Kong publication writes: “Frankly, the truth is that in China, political and entertainment news rub shoulders.”

Where Has All the Chinese Internet Traffic Gone? – Business Solutions to Content Overload in China

The Chinese content market offers a fascinating comparison to the rest of the global Internet. According to research by KPCB and Hillhouse Capital, Chinese Internet users numbered 688 million by the end of 2015. Sina Weibo, China’s Twitter clone, saw its market worth catch up to Twitter at around 11 billion dollars in 2016. Tencent, the owner of popular social messaging app WeChat, achieved a market capitalization of $242.04 billion in August 2016.

An underlying factor to consider in understanding China’s online content market is its unique appeal to readers. The Internet offers Chinese users more space for free expression and access to news than offline. That unique appeal translates into more eyeballs and advertising revenue, and Chinese businesses have been fighting fiercely over the prize. Here is a snapshot of two notable trends in China’s mobile content apps market, currently dominated by WeChat but remaining open to ambitious and nimble startups:

Information overload

Like elsewhere, content has exploded on the Chinese Internet and harmed user experience. For example, the Financial Times ran an article in April 2016 titled “Overloaded China users battle ‘WeChat fatigue’” stating that many of the app’s 806 million users find WeChat content, distributed through channels which include 13 million official accounts, “overwhelming and useless.” According to academics at Fudan University and Guangdong Foreign Language University, China’s top mobile news apps, such as Tencent and Sohu, suffer from the same malaise of overflowing information that is badly organized and comes with little personalization. One important demographic factor underpinning this problem of too much content chasing too few viewers is that the growth in both users and time spent on the Internet has been flattening, according to the tech site Huxiu.

User response in turn has been punishing. According to a year-end report on the “WeChat Ecosystem” by Yeezan, a digital media service platform, official accounts are losing followers and page views; featured stories at popular accounts (some with millions of followers) see an 8.9% click-through rate. Dishonest tactics attempting to cover up such decline illustrate the extent of the problem. Reports of faked clicks and bought “zombie” followers to the tune of 1,000 for $3 on WeChat went viral in September 2016.

Solutions to information overload reshaping the content space

In some fascinating ways, WeChat is illustrating the possible outer limits of content distribution via social networking. Chinese commentators have pointed to sources of strain within WeChat that are likely contributing to its declining reach:

1. As social grows, quality slumps:

Both the quality and personalization of the information users receive tend to decline as social network broadens and content from less familiar contacts dilute the information stream, until the stream explodes by several orders of magnitude;

2. Winner-take-all:

The of traffic flows to a small number of top influencers, and the cost of acquiring followers is increasingly steep for latecomers.

3. A laggard in algorithm adoption, WeChat still largely relies on a timeline structure with minimum filtering.

Users have been flocking to curation that pares down content in ways tailored to their preferences. Jingri Toutiao (“Today’s Headlines”), the 4-year-old newcomer mobile news app that has gained an impressive advantage over competitors from traditional portals (such as Netease, Sohu and Tencent), solves the problem using algorithms with impressive success. It now boasts 580 million users, 63 million active daily users, and some of the longest average daily use time in the industry. Tencent News comes in a remote second, with 120 million users.

Consequently, there are now signs that the news industry is investing in algorithms and moving away from human curation. The Chief Editor at Sohu News, for example, is leaving the company, and CEO Zhang Chaoyang admitted to reporters that they are reorganizing the editorial team to take advantage of machine curation. Zhihu, Quora’s Chinese equivalent, stopped having its team of professional experts curate answers, throwing open the door to all users to crowdsource recommendations.

What next?

From the point of view of Chinese users, there is a lot of room for improvement. In response to declining reach, advertisers have been pulling back from WeChat. The WeChat team is now getting its toes wet in developing algorithms and intervening more actively in content distribution. One analyst pointed out that, even though the company is sitting on a goldmine of data comparable to that of Facebook, only 10%, or $514 million, of Tencent’s overall revenue comes from advertising, of which WeChat’s advertising income is only a portion. Similarly, despite its vaunted technical edge, Toutiao’s content customization is rudimentary compared to Facebook’s FYI. Yidian, Toutiao’s acknowledged rival that just received D-series funding, is vowing to improve user experience with a combination of search, human and machine curation. A head-on collision between WeChat and upstart rivals may be hovering on the horizon, and bear close watching. A lot of money hangs in the balance.

 

 

 

常春藤廢人：給虎爸虎媽的床邊故事

 

“你說他什麼？”
“他根本沒告訴她。”
“他怎麼會這樣？”
“他就是這樣。”
“你說後來是誰告訴她的？”
“同事。決定以後兩個星期。”
“他有沒有跟她解釋？”
“到離婚那天也沒解釋過一個字。”
“兩個孩子呢？”
“就跟她啊。”
“那她工作也不換？還繼續跟他同事？”
“是耶魯啊，換掉！換到哪裡去？”

故事很簡單，很燒腦。一對年輕華裔夫婦，雙雙學界新星，不知怎的，湊巧總是女的選擇退讓輔佐，搞枯燥的行政工作掙錢養家，修洗碗機，生兒育女。寒窯十多年，他成為終身職的耶魯大學教授。她終於從不相干的同事隨口的恭賀裡聽見消息，遲了兩個星期。他什麼都沒說。沒有辯白，安慰或解釋，簽字離婚。

男女主角我見過，男的略熟一點。圓圓的眼睛，嘴角生得一副自來笑，都跟填了塊灼黑冷鐵的眼神犯冲。說不了幾句話，偶爾語驚四座，卻是埋著頭咕噥出來的。女的是那種難得的活潑，叫人樂意親近，近了也不帶刺的甜姐兒。他家人都說他對不起妻子。若說他就是陳世美，明明外頭又沒有人。誰會去睡一張車床？他近年來連難得的俏皮話都不說了。

他玩過重金屬樂團，寫歌似乎很有幾分才氣。他媽到現在還是常提，“若不是我攔得早，你哪來的今天。”

每一段婚姻都是南京大報恩寺那樣凌雲摩天的五色琉璃塔，閒人只能在塔基徘徊惋嘆兩句，進不去看不清，插不上嘴。但是我老想多一句嘴。我比別人好像多知道一點。

又是一個常春藤廢人。

美國的廢人，據他們自己說，像是很不少。美國的哲學家或文化評點泰斗，得往電視往夜店裡找，都是講脫口秀的，郭德綱一流人物。在大麻合法之前，美國社會門戶大開，“供應兩種刺激物質，週一到五咖啡因值班，支持生產力，週末酒精接力，這樣才能喝高喝笨，不至於察覺自己在坐大牢”（比爾稀客思，Bill Hicks, 1961-94)。 由此推斷，上班族不廢不笨的，少之又少。

但是常春藤批量生產的那些，卻大家齊了心，鉗口不提。板上釘釘，背後一個絕大的媒體陰謀。

我老撞見這些廢人，清一色亞裔，可見陰謀的凶狠毒辣，歧視我們。有的功績彪炳：大使館專員，聯邦巡迴法院本區官階最高的法務官。乍看最廢的一個，哈佛學士，史丹佛法商學院雙探花，牛津遊學還拿過個正經的二流獎，學歷相加起來相當於一座紫金牌坊，砸得死一兩車雙眼放光羨艷的虎爸虎媽。他可不是東亞病夫，肩膀可以跑馬，體貌特別揚我東亞雄風的那種棒子弟兄。

他找了分不上不下坐辦公桌的活，不冷不熱的做著。不動用同學關係，做金融國貿，不考國務院商務部外交官的試。外頭的矽谷何止黃金遍地，上市的股票多如樹葉，吹口氣就是數額任填的銀票。他冷靜的旁觀，說想寫本書。聊起天來，他的想法總是半途斷掉，說不上來他心裡有什麼。

大家都納悶。跟看見周子瑜坐街角賣珍奶差不多。

有一回他靜靜的說：“父母親要的，我全做到了。那些學位不是都到手了嗎，還少什麼？”

我答不上來。突然想起中過舉人，在船頭微微的雪影裡，一襲猩猩紅袈裟倒頭下拜，把天大的恩情還諸父母的寶玉。

還有一位，高堂老父八九十歲，盼著抱孫。官階頗高打進了本來是白人圈子的專業，資歷華彩炫目。好容易喜歡上了人，是職場暗戀，對方已經訂婚了，跟他並不熟，可能性近乎零。是叫座的韓劇劇本，放在美國此時此地，則是心理諮詢的範本。

中文不怎麼樣，想送母親中文書看，我推薦了齊邦媛的巨流河和王鼎鈞的抗戰回憶錄，他父母同代人的作品。他說跟家人沒什麼話說，真得靠這些書籍找話題，可惜他看不了。反正親子對話，就是兩老合力催他找對象。跟他相比，耶魯教授的父母倒也還該偷著樂；這一位鑽石單身狗，結婚禮堂的門檻都沒跨過。

他是清朝末世某位力挽狂瀾的名臣後裔，有一八幾，隆長臉頗有幾分相似那位網上都搜得到肖像的先祖，別人看他總要年輕十來歲，亞洲人經得起擱。畢竟也坐五望六的人了。

這些廢人的障礙心結，和極客宅男不一樣。二次元徜徉忘返啦，看到事業線如登極樂啦，在我看來，都算健康自然頭好壯壯。他們不是那樣。

他們也都各有各的故事。耶魯教授的父母相敬如冰，或許他寧願不像他們。說不定他欠妻子的債欠累了。想換個自己，不要只蹲在和妻子相處久了，她熟習的模子裡，生怕嚇著了她一動也不動。紫金學歷矽谷隱者只是順應自己的性情，他畢竟不是哪家新銳公司的股票，市場可以隨便定價，他的人生他做主，誰能給他貼成器不成器的標籤？

而且，鄉民一樣會離婚，失戀，找不到事業的方向。

可是跟這些名校人生勝利組念過書同過事聊過天，我總有種感覺，他們都是晴雯。“補雖補了，到底不像——我也再不能了！”用盡全力，裝飾了父母的夢。自己慢慢的力盡神危。

不准失敗。不可以戀愛。永遠趕不上期待。

父母胸口的勳章獎牌，煥然華彩。

女兒順口提了一句：我這數學已經算上來了，總分是B，這學期到現在考的都是B 和 C。我心裡緩緩浮出一隻巴掌，做勢甩過去：考個乙你也好意思誇口，你不害臊，我都替你害臊！我眼睜睜和那隻長著獰厲眼嘴的巴掌對看，等它化作青煙四散。

我問要不要幫忙。

算了，我還是找爸爸吧，她說。你每次都繃得好緊。

對不起，我說。

她親親我的臉。可憐的嘟嘟，她說，你小時候被打被罵才會變這樣的，不是你的錯。

那還不是最糟的，我說。父母為了我犧牲，最吃不消。

咱華人有個習慣，與其說服，認為恫嚇更合情合理。或許我講這些也只是在嚇人。天知道，華人都是嚇大的。

我很樂意聽名臣後裔聊他的苦戀，我讀過宋詞，有足夠的文化訓練，不會認為他對一個陌生人的感覺是跟踪偷窺，需要叫警察。他大學專攻過中古法語，和父母激烈爭執多年，他們怕他走上了歪路，所有的叛逆大概就是那時候用掉了。“你知道戰爭與和平裡，羅斯托夫伯爵家的少年少女晚上滑雪橇開心玩的那一段？她讓我想起透過雪聲的鈴聲，娜塔莎的笑聲。”

我也聽見了。那些夢想的窸窣銀聲，像一場紛紛的大雪。

且玩且讀 —— 歐遊讀書雜記

旅遊的時候，要不要帶書，帶什麼樣的書，一向是個為難的選擇。最正宗的自然是「量身定做派」︰知道要去黃山或康斯坦丁堡了，就事先作好功課，勤懇精確的帶上《徐霞客遊記》或蒙太固夫人的《土耳其使館書簡》（Turkish Embassy Letters, Lady Mary Wortley Montagu）。除此之外，還有認為「行萬里路，讀萬卷書」的上下聯勢不能同時並行不悖，堅持純粹體驗，旅行時只讀導遊書的「原教旨派」；擔心被職業導遊和七彩明信片的刻板印象先入為主，連導遊書也不看，要保留想像童貞直到和異地相見歡為止的「驚喜掛帥派」；以及因為沒作功課，錯過羅孚宮的水晶妝臺或融聖妙狂蕩于一身的聖德列莎雕像，捶胸頓足的「事後追悔派」等等。于這些派別，我或多或少都做過入門弟子，滄桑甘苦，一時也說不盡。

這次去歐洲，是我第一次順其自然，哪塊書磚掉下來砸到頭就帶哪塊，沒有刻意強求書本必須和旅途沾親帶故。一共兩本，一本是兩個月前看過書評，在網上隨意預訂之後就忘光光；到出門那天早晨圖書館才來電郵通知，飛車去取沒時間衡量的《艷麗的土壤︰顏色的發明與美術史》。一本則是十年前看過，至今已經全無印象等于新書的《玫瑰的名字》，出門前二十分鐘隨手抓的。

沒想到，這兩本書就像事先配好套似的，和旅程相輔相成，絲絲入扣。

早早遭文字蠱鈍，對繪畫彫刻的反應一直停留在「很像很像」的我，偏偏和許多裝模作樣的讀書人一樣，總覺得這樣沒美術素養很可恥、很不體面。幸好想起來，心理學先驅威廉‧詹姆斯好像說過，人是先跪下然後才對神明起敬畏之心的。所以，我的雙膝在歐陸的美術館階上，都快跪腫了。每次去每次看，看不懂也要看，就巴望能從朝聖的空虛儀式裡培育出信仰真知來。《艷麗的土壤》可真讓我悟了道。比方說，原來聖母的衣服都是藍的，是因為十九世紀以前西方畫家用的藍顏料都是半寶石搗煉的，特別貴重。到柏林、倫敦的時候我就伸長了脖子用心看，聖母果然是穿藍的多呢！以往走過多少趟，從來也沒注意過﹐可見書是不能不讀的。（還是說觀察能力如此低落的腦袋，就拿書來修也沒希望了？)

說正經的，作者談各代畫家或因顏料會退色、或財力不足、或原料難得，用色時大受限制，照理講都是常識而已，我這藝術白痴卻是聞所未聞，大開眼界。比方說，倫敦維多利亞博物館裡，拉斐爾給掛毯作坊畫的底稿不是「正經畫」，而是準備剪成一片片墊在機底給織工照著織的「颯颯去」物件。畫門徒捕魚與耶穌神蹟的時候，耶穌的衣裾用的不是耐久的銀硃，而是便宜的植物染料，到現在早已退成蒼茫的灰白。水裡耶穌的倒影卻還是真材實料，紅灩瀲瀲，兩相對照似真似幻、誤打誤撞的居然有種哲理的神異——人性與神性的並存？

小拉當初是怎麼想的呢？完美主義者和現實妥協得快抓狂了，細節處明知于事無補的奢侈一下來取得平衡？知道作坊裡折騰得多顏色退得快，只好在倒影上提醒織工一下？還是預算沒抓準，錢用完了？光憑書裡學的一點皮毛，就可以胡思亂想好久，像打開整整一個阿房宮，看裡頭綠雲擾擾，明星熒熒，渭流漲膩直打到腳上，是畫家在調色，畫寶石和絲絨，倒洗畫筆的水，動腦筋剋扣顏料錢好補大毛、二毛的襪子，就像菜市場小販在磅秤上耍花樣。像這樣，懂得一點創作過程裡現實與理想的落差，美術品和畫家都伸臂踢腿的活過來，不只是一生下地已經披盔貫甲、完滿無缺的神祇。

這次去愛丁堡以北的聖安德魯，是頭一次到蘇格蘭。想當年，天主教和新教在各國爭鬥慘烈，許多中古的宏偉寺院就此遭殃，聖安德魯大教堂便是一例。本來嘛，跑這種斷垣殘壁的古蹟最乏味了，放眼看去只是一堆爛石頭，遊客懾於盛名不得不走一趟，看不出所以然來，往往敗興而歸。好好，也許別的遊客比我有慧根，我承認，連頭尾俱全的凡爾賽宮，我還恨不該一應傢俱陳設都革命革光了，像吃空心湯圓。燒得塌得只剩頭蓋骨、半邊肩膀的和尚廟，有什麼好看的？

可手持一冊《玫瑰的名字》一切都不同了。艾柯從書裡探出頭來，就連石頭都和他一問一答。哪，那邊二十公尺高的哥德式複花長窗的殘破花飾，看久了漸漸浮凸圓足，是當日裸女與人頭馬在聖徒眼皮下公然交合的詭艷彫刻。看看錶，十一點鐘，在早起的僧侶們已經是下午了。他們可沒錶，清晨三點就得上堂早禱，報曉的雄雞又靠不住，只好專人擔任人鐘，熬夜不睡。早禱的時候，另有人拿著燈在旁邊監視，只要抓到你前仰後合，燭光馬上抖到臉上來，妙的是儼然成為儀式的一部份。(不像小學朝會，不管多少小朋友中暑昏倒，老師還是一副不能置信的表情。如果有個高瞻遠矚的校長，事先授命每班挑一個芝麻官，配備水壺，一看到倒下去的晝寢朽木馬上澆醒，就不至于要一個個向醫護室抬了。)

走過終年飄雨、瑩潤如芝的青草地，我不脫華人習氣的按書中插圖擬想廚房該在哪裡。沒有老婆，總得吃好一點吧？富裕的寺院自給自足，宰了豬放下一大缸的血，不像老美避之唯恐不及，而是留著寺內自製臘腸。村裡的貧農少女如肯陪老醜的僧侶睡覺，也可分一杯羹。昨天飯店供應蘇格蘭名菜羊雜腸（haggis），黑褐燕麥帶血條濃香實腴，和豬血糕長得像表兄弟，寺院想必常吃。看來僧侶的日子和利用尿桶、佛燭燉罈子肉的和尚一樣，差不到那裏去。

石柱纖巧得像玻璃吹出來的拱頂窖室清森有鬼氣，讓人想起書裡的藏寶地窖，得化點力氣把在各地美術館看到的諸多聖骨盒、祭器、書匣、十字架、權杖、袍服、冠冕、絲毯、畫屏、寶飾都搬運過來。看哪，家用神龕的兩根黃金與青金石柱框住精工的耶穌下葬銀雕，頂著嵌黑縞瑪瑙底、鑲代表十三門徒的十三塊鑽石的黃金十字架，三角楣上以五色瑪瑙與紅寶石鑲成扇貝形邊飾。在這金寶堆裡樂以忘死的執事長老雖說貪財怕事，卻不是連續劇裡對著銀兩搓手咂嘴口吐白沫的丑角。跟他走過深幽迴廊，石雕鏤析下陽光有如金束，照得他手上的戒指虹彩輝煌。聽他高談珍寶的語言，就連惡魔都不能不魂飛魄喪——綠玉髓、黃碧璽和水蒼玉的華美讓魔王回想起他光明之子的過去，煥燦火光則代表地獄的無間熱苦……。

我就這麼和俊美天真的艾索和料事如神的「英國諸葛」威廉長老作伴走過中世紀，門票是手裡三塊五美金買的平裝本。讀書就是玩，玩完了書看得更透，旅途上的見聞風物紛紛撲進書裡，書頁紛飛又包羅了旅途的一切。既不須先作功課也不用事後追悔，真乃賞心樂事也！

唾面自干：中国右派为什么迷恋川普？

脸书上认识的大陆朋友有好些是川普迷。因为是我极敬重的人，存而不论，路过的时候不点赞，闷声大发财。至少这一点我和美国人学透了，他们社交时对政治题材的态度，叫我想起高中的体育老师。两三百磅『不重则不威』的体态，她远远站在池边，手持一把十来尺长银晃晃形如张飞蛇矛的家伙，对抱紧了水泥池岸，泡得嘴唇发绀蓝的我说：『游啊，只管游，淹了水我捞你上来。』就是敬而远之的意思。美国人若是谈话溺水了，不小心不得已碰到了政治边际，也只是远远的拿捞子拍两下水，连鞋都不肯湿一湿。虽然看了气闷，实是可贵的风度。

为什么这些笃信民主的大陆朋友，看不出川普的恶形恶状？按下他们的厌女症，看不上希拉里且不谈，我想是有历史原因的。小说家韩少功说；

『如果沒有「文革」那麼多人權災難，沒有知識分子群體對紅色時代的滿肚子苦水，以及出於人之常情的怨恨，中國90年代以來的資本主義神話是否會少一點狂熱和偏執？中國知識群體主流對西方的崇拜，遠遠超過了印度、俄國、巴西、南非等國家的同行，但這種國情是怎麼形成的？是否正是「文革」式「極左」政治的自然反彈？』

虽说这些大陆右派朋友执迷川普情有可原，我还是必须多一句嘴：这些误会往往并不美丽。华人扯着何仙姑叫舅妈，跟极右白人拉近乎，不始于今日。02年我吐槽过台湾极右派的天真无邪：
 

網路上常看到台灣人附和歐美的極右派，唾罵猶太人「橫蠻自大，把持經濟命脈」，拍著大腿嘆惜二次大戰德國的「最後解決方案」沒能徹底把他們滅了種。種種謬論，總之新納粹說什麼他信什麼。以阿的一筆糊塗帳且不談，我真搞不懂為什麼有些台灣人對法西斯的亞利安種族偏見這麼心甘情願地照單全收。在那些極右派心裡，黃種人比「猶太豬玀」更等而下之，華人主動挨過去跟他們結盟，只怕多有不便。

 

还是海外一个新秀新闻站最是一针见血，说到了根子上：

川普口中“伟大的美国”，其实没有你——华裔

 

『那些支持者种族仇恨的对象，不仅有包着头巾行为奇怪的穆斯林，吃低保到处犯罪的黑人，也有抢走他们工作吃狗肉的亚洲人。如果你认为在他们眼中的中国人和其他移民不一样，你就错了，不然就不会有纽约时报关于亚洲人在街头被人吼“滚回你的中国”这样的故事了。』

 

他们这一讲，我不免想起我作为美籍华人，『人民当家作主』，给过共和党『一块儿我的脑袋』（美国俚语）。四五年前去本地的县赶集（county fair), 带孩子看看牲口，坐旋转咖啡杯，吃点子棉花糖啥的，遇见站岗的共和党。候选人西装革履，欠身握手殷勤赶着我拉票。我行礼如仪，客气的告诉他：『我搬来美国三十余年，作為读過研的白領，无论从哪一重身份看来：移民，亚裔，女性，中產，贵党的所论所为，从未予我替我出力的印象。希望贵党以后能够校正方向，争取我们的票仓。』（这是美式的温柔敦厚。我其实想说你大爷的你们哪一回不是践踏我们去讨好白人男主子？每次这样违反本性，很吃力好吗，害我又多吃了一团棉花糖。）

现下可好，川普这小子，连羊皮都不肯披一披，还不如当年的共和党远甚。一群华人竟赶着他认大爷，被指着脸骂了，唾面自干。我看了，心里实在难受。在家裡做不得主，出来又找欺负。什么时候才能跳出极右极左，永远在法西斯和共产党一对难兄难弟之间做不算抉择的抉择的怪圈？

Google Translate Chinese: Passionate Mainframes

 

Google Translate claims that it has made significant strides. A couple of Sinologists I know tested it for Chinese to English, and declared it wanting. I figured I’d round out the picture, and test it the other way around.

 

Admittedly this is a short list. Give me a reason to make it longer next time, Google.

 

Save the date

Google translation: Expiration date. (保存日期 )

Human translation: 标记日历

 

（Airbnb) Passionate and dedicated hosts

Google translation: Filled with passion and dedicated mainframes (充满激情和专用主机 )

Human translation: 热忱尽心的房东

 

(Paradise Lost) Evil, come be my good

Google translation: ungrammatical; the closest English gibberish may be: “Evil, good what is come belongs to me.” (邪恶，来是我的好。）

Human translation: Evil, come be my good (恶呀，你来做我的善吧。)

 

This last flourish of genius was quoted by the rediscovered writer Mu Xin （木心),  a recent cult phenomenon among the liberal educated young in China. Not sure if the rendition originated with him, or whether some Republican-era translator supplied it.

『閒話英文中譯』: 查生字水性楊花之必要

 

上看到一篇文章，提到中國政府的網路說唱曲和卡通宣傳策略，“中国当局不断通过网络说唱曲和卡通片等加强海外宣传攻势，已引起海外媒体关注。美国《时代》周刊最新一期报道了中国的一个最新的宣传作品说唱曲“这是中国”，认为“这首中国宣传说唱是迄今录制的最令人痛苦的歌”。

原文作 “the most painful song ever recorded,” 看了不怕小粉紅不驕敵自得，大外宣把美帝調戲得拖甲曳兵，創痛平生。殊不知原文字面上意思，並非去到盡頭的劇痛，而近乎北京俗語的“牙磣，” 像聽釘子刮玻璃那種鑽到牙齦裡的酸冷，實在是“做事離譜之極，旁人看著都替你難受著急”之意。認真要中譯，或可寫做“令人不忍卒聽。” 又則，這句型並非正規書面語，乃年輕人誇張輕倩沒三兩重的口語，網路博眼球之用。類似造句包括：

OMG, I’d never seen an outfit that hideous in my life!

諸如此類的“至今最…””有生以來從來沒…” 不建議直接口服，要配著”腦袋瓜那麼大的一顆鹽”吞下（take it with a grain of salt the size of my head。”中文人話的說法，就是“聽聽就好“”酌量參考。”不相信，看紐時或衛報，選情再火爆，川普再胡鬧，也絕不使用最高級形容詞：Donald Trump Is the Most Hate-driven Candidate in US History (川普是美國有史以來最滿腔恨毒的總統候選人）

現代中文翻英文，深情款款，此心不渝，看到辭典第一義就認死扣。依我說，還是水性楊花一點的好。順便多事雞婆一句（大陸的說法是：鹹吃蘿蔔淡操心）— 上圖據說摹寫的是杜甫的麗人行，“楊花雪落覆白蘋，青鳥飛去銜紅巾。” 杜甫不怕跨省，對網警比中指，公然搬出楊國忠和妹妹虢国夫人亂倫的性醜聞壓軸： “炙手可熱勢絕倫， 慎莫近前丞相嗔，” 膽兒肥碩頂喉嚨了，壯哉！

中文觀點：https://pao-pao.net/article/718 中共“军事文化网络主题论坛”上透露了什么信息

英文原文：http://time.com/4388991/china-rap-propaganda-cd-rev/